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Introduction
• Central to fault-tolerant computing is redundancy mange-
ment.
• Common to proofs of fault-tolerance is a maximum fault
assumption.
If there are m or fewer faults in the system, then ...
• Typically a maximum fault assumption is rather restric-
tive. Usually, this is necessary to avoid assumptions about
the behavior of faulty channels.
-For Interactive consistency, in order to tolerate m
faults, 3m + 1 nodes are required.
- For a majority vote, 2m + 1 channels are required.
• A maximum fault assumption is useful because it allows
us to reason about fault tolerance in the presence of arbi-
trarily malicious fault behavior. However, analysis of the
architecture may establish certain scenarios in which the
assumption may be weakened.
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• Should fault-tolerant systems incorporate features which
attempt to recover from failure combinations which exceed
the maximum fault assumption?
• If so, what is the proof obligation?
• At the very least, it is necessary to show that existing
proofs which depend upon the maximum fault assumption
still hold.
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Hypothetical Scenario
Imagine that plurality voting circuit has been developed for use
in a a four channel fault-tolerant computing system. Suppose
that a designer is considering using this circuit in a system
which depends upon a majority vote in order to maintain cor-
rect system state.
Can this voting circuit be used in this system?
First we define existence predicates for majority and plural-
ity as follows:
VB.majority_ezists B =_ FINITE B A 3x.Inl < 21BIz
VB.plurality_exists B - 3x.Vx'.(x _ x') D IBIz, < IBI_
Where B is a bag_ IBI represents its cardinality, and IBI_
represents the count of x in B.
t Essentially a bag is a set without absorption. [a, a, b] = [b, a, a], but [a, b] ¢ [a, a, b]
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From these we define the following functions:
VB.majority B = e x.[B[ < 2[B[x
VB.plurality B = E x.Vx'.(x _ x') D IBIs, < IB]_
The property we need to prove is
VB.majority_ezists B D (majority B = plurality B).
The first step was to show that
VB.majority_ezists B 3 plurality_exists B
For this, we needed to prove the following lemma:
VB.FINITE B D (Vx y.(x _ y) D IBl_ _<(IBI- IB[x))
From this lemma, coupled with rewriting the right conjunct
of majority_exists to
3x.(IB I -IBIx)< IBIs,
and then using transitivity of '<' and '<' we can establish tile
existence of plurality from the existence of majority.
In order to show tile equivalence between majority and plu.
rality we needed to establish uniqueness from existence (i.e.
if it exists then its unique). This allowed us to substitute in
one side of the equation and then show that the chosen value
satisfied the predicate embedded in the other. 2
_Thanks to Brian Graham of the University of Calgary for submitting his methods of
dealing with the HOL choice operator ('e ' or '@') to the info-hol mailing list.
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Once this was done we looked at proving some other simple
facts about voting which may be useful in the analysis of fault-
tolerant architectures. Specifically, we proved the preservation
of majority for a few common reconfiguration schemes.
• Graceful Degradation
• Perfect Spares
• Imperfect Spares
Of course, we neglected one of the more difficult aspects of
reconfiguration, namely that of correctly identifying the faulty
channel. All that we have done is prove a little bit of common
sense.
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Graceful Degradation
The simplest reconfiguration strategy is graceful degradation.
This consists of removing a faulty channel and continuing pro-
cessing with one less channel of redundancy. The proof for
this case showed that a majority is preserved if a non-majority
clement is removed from consideration.
First we show existence
VB.Vz. majority_exists B D
(z _ majority B) D
majority_exists ( B - x)
This essentially reduces to showing
IBI < 21BIz, _ (IBI- 1) < 21BIz,.
From existence we get uniqueness so we can then show
VB.Vx. majority_exists B D
e B)
(x _ majority B) D
(majority B = majority (B - x))
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Perfect Spares
Sometimes, in addition to removing a faulty channel, a good
channel is added to the configuration. To capture this scenario,
we showed that the insertion of the majority element to a bag
preserved both existence and value of the majority.
VB. majority_exists B D
majority_exists((majority B) 0 B)
VB. majority_exists B D
(majority ((majority B) ® B) = majority B)
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Imperfect Spares
Finally, recognizing that it is possible for spares to fail, it
was shown that the removal of a non-majority (e.g.failed) el-
ement coupled with the addition of an arbitrary element (of
thr proper type) ",dso preserves both existence and the value of
m;_jority.
VB. majority_exists B D
Vx x'. (x E B) D
(z _= majority B) D
majority_exists ( x' ® ( B - x ) )
VB. majority_exists B D
Vx z'. (x E B) D
(x # majority B) D
(( majority ( x' ® ( B - x ) ) ) = ( majority B ) )
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Future Efforts
• Establish a base for reasoning about error manifestations
in order to reason about Fault Detection and Isolation.
When can you conclude that a redundant channel is
faulty?
• Explore the effects that incorporating a plurality voter
would have on the OS proofs.
This would require adding assumptions concerning the
behavior of faulty channels.
• Explore possible ways to incorporate rcconfiguration strate-
gies into the OS effort.
How do you differentiate between a perm_tnent and a
transient fault?
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